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Text and precedent are an old pair. So old it should frighten us
that we do not have a theory of their interaction. Precedent is the
device by which a sequence of cases dealing with the same problem
may be called law rather than will, rules rather than results. (In a
system of civil law there may be no "precedent" at all, on the con-
ceit that the Code contains all rules and the gloss none.) To have a
theory of precedent is to have a theory of the extent to which
judges' acts are law. Yet we do not have such a theory. Veteran
judges such as Cardozo can proclaim that no theory is possible, that
adherence to precedent is simply a matter of trial and error, and
that when adherence is too dissonant with other rules or too harm-
ful because of effects of the rules, we shall stop adhering.' There we
have it-a grand balancing test, with neither a maximand nor
weights to produce a decision when the criteria conflict, as they al-
ways do. Few Justices hint at a theory of precedent; no Justice has
produced a consistent theory; although the academy is awash with
competing theories of substantive law, there is no contest in the the-
ory of stare decisis. Not because one candidate has swept the
boards, but because no one has a principled theory to offer.
This backwater of the law is nonetheless incalculably important
for the theory of adjudication as well as the practice. Precedent is
important for reasons other than the desire that likes be treated
alike, so that decisions can be called law. It is valuable for reasons
classical liberals should approve because it is the way in which rules
arise without a central authoritative decider. The stock of prece-
dents is produced by generations of judges wrestling with hard
questions. They study the problems and record their conclusions,
as traders of coal study its qualities and make their bids. Like the
price of coal, the system of precedent may incorporate more wisdom
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago.
I See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142-80 (1921). Karl
Llewellyn took the position that the interaction ofjudges on a multi-judge court, and a
sense of the leeway in the existing cases, rather than texts and rules, are the sources of
stability in decisionmaking. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 19-61 (1960);




than any single trader or judge possesses. Precedent decentralizes
decisionmaking and allows each judge to build on the wisdom of
others. In a world where questions arise faster than the information
necessary to supply answers, this is a boon. Precedent not only
economizes on information but also cuts down on idiosyncratic con-
clusions by subjecting each judge's work to the test of congruence
with the conclusions of those confronting the same problem. This
increases both the chance of the court's being right and the likeli-
hood that similar cases arising contemporaneously will be treated
the same by different judges.
Yet to express the role of precedent as one of economizing on
information and of cutting down idiosyncracies is to show why it will
be unstable. Although the system of precedent impounds informa-
tion and wisdom greater than any judge can bring to bear, no partic-
ular decision does so. A given case may have been tossed off
between sandwiches or based on a factual blunder.2 In principle,
modern judges have all the information available to their forbears,
plus any discoveries in the interim, and the benefit of hindsight.
Judges often decide cases on the basis of predictions about the ef-
fects of the legal rule. We can examine these effects-both for other
strands of doctrine and for the world at large-and improve on the
treatment of the earlier case.3 This possibility of improvement
makes precedent unstable. It ought to be unstable, provided we can
focus judges' attention and bring to the case sufficient care to be
sure that our information exceeds that of the judges who acted ear-
lier. Yet this also means that we do not have-never can have-a
comprehensive theory of precedent, any more than we can have a
complete theory of the "just price" of wheat, or of when to spend
more time studying the attributes of securities. There is an equilib-
rium degree of disequilibrium.
Precedent is under pressure from other sources as well, sources
that ensure continual evolution and occasional sharp breaks. One is
the power of ex post claims. Precedents-rules-are based on cate-
gorical predictions: rule utilitarianism, when that is the system of
reasoning. Each case may seem to be an exception. Perhaps the
rule may be subdivided; perhaps a claim of act utilitarian nature ap-
pears to countermand the rule; perhaps a simple ex post claim for
"fair" division of the stakes, the future be damned, will appeal to
2 For example, the infamous Enelow-Ettelson doctrine. See Employers Ins. of
Wausau v. Shell Oil Co., 820 F.2d 898 (7th Cir. 1987); Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Maya-
camas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988) (overruling the doctrine).
3 See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 211.
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judges.4 These are all temptations to be resisted, but judges often
yield. That will put pressure on good rules. Sometimes the power
of these claims will produce bad rules (multi-factor balancing test
with two tiers, three prongs per tier, and four tines per prong);
these flabby cases should come under pressure in turn. Too many
forks in doctrine produce forks in tongues.
There will also be pressure because no one can quantify how
bad is bad enough. We can see the virtue of abandoning Plessy,5
Swift v. Tyson, 6 Lochner,7 even Low v. Austin,8 despite the fact that each
lasted fifty years or more. Low, for those who don't remember, was
the original-package doctrine of 1872, disabling states from taxing
or regulating goods until removed from their original packages. It
led to all sorts of bizarre warehousing adaptations and doctrinal cur-
licues. It is the reason why only a constitutional amendment could
produce Prohibition: without the amendment, states could not stop
the importation and distribution of liquor in its original package.
One day in 1976 the Court overruled Low, in a case where the par-
ties hadn't even asked. 9 After the original package doctrine van-
ished, everyone instantly forgot what it had been all about.
Doctrines with sufficiently bad pedigrees or sufficiently bad ef-
fects must go, but this is argument by weasel word-how bad is bad
enough? Do reliance interests counsel caution? Surely some, but
how much? We have no way to reduce these questions to a common
metric and therefore no way to give the answer.
Next there is the problem that the alternative to disavowing
precedent is manipulating it-and again we have no sound way
other than shared values of the legal culture to deal with such ma-
nipulation. Some "manipulation" is beneficial. The need to get
around a doctrine may show that there is some problem. Just as a
series of anomalies in the data may spur scientists to propose a new
theoretical model, so a series of "manipulative" cases that evade or
mischaracterize some existing precedent may set the stage for over-
ruling. Or they may show the value of the precedent, leading the
manipulative cases to be buried and the original doctrine to be
reaffirmed.
Manipulation as experiment is inevitable and sometimes benefi-
cial. But like biological mutation, manipulation may do a lot of
harm to a few people before dying out. How do we recognize and
4 See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Eco-
nomic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 10-12 (1984).
5 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
7 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
8 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871).
9 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
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control manipulation, to separate the beneficial experiments from
the claims ofjust-this-one-time, the siren song of ex post division?
Neither legal system nor legal culture contains a method of identify-
ing the "good-ness" of a given manipulation, and there is no way to
control it. Manipulation is possible because the precedent does not
constrain the selection of which factors matter. Was Plessy a case
about blacks on trains, or was it aboutJim Crow? It could have been
read broadly or narrowly. Which features of a case matter will be
influenced by subsequent developments in the legal culture.
Then there is the problem of public choice.10 Kenneth Arrow
showed that when institutions make decisions by majority vote, they
will generate logically inconsistent results unless the voters have
very similar orderings of choices. Over many years the court will
leave behind precedents that, if not inconsistent, generate inconsis-
tent implications. We have been told in tort law, for example, that
physicians must give elaborate warnings of the risks of their serv-
ices, to protect the autonomy of the patients to decide what treat-
ment to receive. We have also been told that laws requiring
physicians to give warnings about the medical service of abortion
are unconstitutional infringements on the autonomy of physicians-
apparently, and incongruously, because these warnings might affect
the patients' choices.II Faced with such tension, what does the sys-
tem of precedent contain, when a judge comes to another case about
warnings? Or about autonomy? Or about abortion? "Adherence"
to precedent when the system has built-in conflicts increases the
judge's power of decision, the opposite of its intended effect. The
judge may decide either way in the name of precedent, while hiding
the actual reasons. Only the overruling or reconstruction of an ear-
lier case can relieve this pressure and restore effective constraint!
The alternatives are either no guidance at all, or a precedential ru-
mor chain, each repetition diverging subtly from its predecessor un-
til the rule bears no resemblance to the original. 12
There is another way in which precedent destabilizes the sys-
tem: path dependence. There is a formal proof that someone who
has control of the order in which decisions are taken can bring
about any result, provided he can reduce each choice to a selection
between two alternatives and provided old disputes are closed.
Each time there is a choice between two pairs, with majority win-
ning. The defeated choice is cast aside and never reemerges-even
10 See generally Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).
11 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 760-64 (1986).
12 See NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 107 S. Ct. 2002, 2016 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Hickey v. Duffy, 827 F.2d 234, 242-43 (7th Cir. 1987).
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if almost all would prefer it to the final choice. The technical proof
is daunting.1 3 The insight is simple. Consider an example in the
Supreme Court: abortion and sodomy. Both deal with sexual pri-
vacy. Suppose decisions occur in this sequence: (1) does the right of
sexual privacy protect abortion?; (2) is this right the same as the
right of sexual privacy about sodomy?; (3) does the right protect
sodomy? The abortion case is decided 7-2 pro, and we learn in Bow-
ers14 that eight of the nine Justices think abortion and sodomy are
identical cases; so if all follow stare decisis, sodomy is protected.
Now reverse the order of decision: if sodomy arrives first and is held
not protected, then abortion also is not protected. The link be-
tween result and the sequence of cases was broken only because
some justices, Powell in this instance, put stare decisis to one side.
No sound system of law allows such fundamental questions to turn
solely on the order in which cases arrive for decision-but stare de-
cisis could do so unless tempered. 15
There must be play in the joints. Only the optimal amount is
uncertain. For a long time judges have said that statutes are differ-
ent from common law and constitutional law. Courts should attach
a meaning to a statute, then let Congress act or not; a court could
only confuse Congress and increase uncertainty by revisiting the
subject; Congress can correct mistakes.1 6 I doubt that this is so. A
statute, like a constitution, is a text-a way in which decisions taken
in the past influence the present. To treat a statute as different de-
nies this role to the text. It assumes, in other words, that as soon as
the judges have spoken, the decision of the past ceases to matter,
and the only question is what the sitting Congress wishes. This sim-
ply denies the purpose of the enterprise: to enforce the decisions of
a prior Congress. (I put to one side decisions under statutes, such
13 McKelvey, General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models, 47
ECONOMETRICA 1085 (1979).
14 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
15 You could give less weight to precedent even at the expense of logical consis-
tency. Consider what would happen if the rule of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956),
under which the state must pay for a criminal defendant's transcript on appeal-even if
there is no constitutional right to take an appeal, were used to require the state to pay
for everyone's newspaper. See Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 588-91 (1987).
This possibility-rather, the variant in which parents say that the Constitution requires
free transportation to school-is before the Supreme Court in Kadrmas v. Dickinson
Pub. Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897 (N.D.), prob. juris. noted, 108 S. Ct. 63 (1987).
16 See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409
(1986). One of the most famous overruling decisions also contains a strong statement
of the special durability of the construction of a statute. trie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938). E. LEVY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 32, 54 (1948)
contains a sophisticated argument in support of this approach. Most other treatments of
the point are more assertion than argument. The Court itself has never offered more
than fragmentary justifications for its custom.
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as the Sherman Act, that transfer a dollop of law-making power to
the courts after the fashion of the common law. I am concerned
here with statutes that might be thought to contain rules rather than
an allocation of power to make rules.)
Treating statutory interpretations as binding-even as "part
of" the statute-might be the best way to proceed if we had one
perpetual Congress sitting full time. But we have had 100 Con-
gresses, all different. Today's Congress may leave in place an inter-
pretation of a law simply because today's coalitions are different.
The failure of a different body to act hardly shows that the interpre-
tation of what an earlier one did is "right."
More than that. It takes less political support to block a law
than to get one passed. The structural features of government make
legislation hard. To break a filibuster requires 60% of the votes,
substantial time, and concessions on other subjects; all may be in
short supply. Suppose Congress # 1 passes a law because it has 65
votes in the Senate and the time to pass it; Congress #2 with 59
Senators supporting the original rule may be unable to reenact it or
unwilling to do so given other priorities. Senators who had ex-
tracted concessions in exchange for their support of the bill on the
first occasion may demand a new set of concessions-and these, cu-
mulatively, may have been too high a price to pay had all been de-
manded in the first instance. There are many related points. For
example, the judicial interpretation itself may create a legislative
constituency, a form of political wealth effect that makes undoing a
decision costly. Agenda influence is at work and may defeat a ma-
jority will as a committee sits on a bill. The coalition may settle on a
second-best position if the first is removed.
We must think of Congress as a discontinuous body. Doing this
affects the theory of precedent. If the purpose of statutory construc-
tion is to carry out the' decisions of the enacting body, the quies-
cence of a later body does not reflect at all on the propriety of the
interpretation.
17
17 The difference between Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 695-
701 (1978), and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987), makes the
point. Although one Justice wrote both opinions, they employ utterly inconsistent
methods to decide when a statutory decision may be reconsidered. Monell says that the
Court may revisit an issue when necessary to produce (1) consistency with prior practice
(as opposed to holdings) and (2) consistency with recent "willingness" of Congress to
legislate municipal liability in other statutes; and when (3) there is an absence of reliance
interests and (4) a plain error in the earlier decision. Transportation Agency talks only
about congressional acquiescence. The two approaches lead to very different results.
Adding United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987), where all the Justices except
Scalia and Powell switched sides from their position in Transportation Agency, shows the
problems of the enterprise. See also Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988), in which the Court unamimously jettisoned a 53-year-old doc-
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Even if Congress were a continuous body, there would still be
two objections to treating statutory interpretation as a special
case.18 One is constitutional structure. Inferring legislative author-
ity from inaction is what the one-house veto case was about. 19 To
change the law you need the concurrence of Congress and Presi-
dent. The action of the President and one house won't do it. So
why should a proposal by the Court change the law if Congress does
not act? Remember, there is a one-house veto within Congress; bi-
cameralism and all that mean that a single house can "veto" a
change in the law in response to a "proposal" embedded in a judi-
cial decision. Inaction of the legislature as a whole means nothing
more than that one house or the President balked. If the first con-
struction of a statute is sacrosanct, then the Court can change the
law forever by making a proposal that is followed by the inaction of
a single house of Congress. That is structurally unsound. We
wouldn't say that if the President promulgates a regulation and
Congress doesn't change the law, then the regulation is the law, be-
yond recall. There is no reason to treat cases differently from
regulations.20
The second objection appears injustice Scalia's dissent in John-
son v. Transportation Agency. 21 It is based on logrolling. Suppose a
majority of both houses wants something (say, preferences for wo-
men in employment) but can't get it-because of a filibuster, be-
trine without even referring to principles of stare decisis-although the Court in Balti-
more Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 185 (1955), had declined to revisit
this doctrine on the ground that Congress was the appropriate body. Grumman seemed
to take the next 33 years of congressional silence as a reason why judges should act!
18 At least, I offer only two. Professor Eskridge offers some others in a critique of
the accepted doctrine quite different from mine. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents,
(forthcoming in GEO. L.J. (1988)). He proposes to relax the strong presumption against
revamping a statute when changing circumstances (including later statutes)-"subse-
quent developments in social mores, public policy, and social trends"-have made the
old interpretation outmoded or undesirable. This proposal depends on his model in
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987), which in turn
accepts too much of G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) for
my taste; statutes are not just helpful advice on how courts should go about governing.
Attention to changing mores is more appropriate in constitutional law, for reasons to
which I return. Still, Professor Eskridge's treatment is an uncommonly thoughtful com-
bination of survey and critique, which no one interested in the subject can overlook.
19 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
20 Treatments that portray the Court and Congress as partners in a dialogue, pro-
ducing a form of "constitutional common law" or "statutory common law," see G. CALA-
BRESI, supra note 18; Merrill, The Common Law Powers of the Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1985); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975), disregard the nature of Congress as a divided and dis-
continuous institution, in which a single house, sometimes a single member, can block
action. By treating Congress as a "person" holding the same views today as twenty
years ago, they assume away the most interesting problems.
21 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
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cause of a veto, because it wants something else even more and
must give up its highest hopes to satisfy opponents. So it settles for
color-blindness, in exchange for which it gets wide application, a
federal enforcement agency, and other benefits. If a court later flips
the color-blindness rule into a preferential rule, the new rule will be
impossible to repeal-that original majority is still there. But using
the inability to repeal the rule as a reason to stand pat on it simply
ignores the fact that legislation is compromise-that laws are not en-
acted section by section, but as a package. 22 If courts become instru-
ments by which packages are undone, laws will be harder to pass.
Bargains must be kept to be believed, and inferences from legisla-
tive inaction are a means by which bargains are broken.
Having challenged the shibboleth that it should be harder to
overrule a statutory decision than a constitutional or common law
decision, I want to kick sand on the shibboleth that it should be eas-
ier to overrule a constitutional decision than a statutory or common
law decision. (No, they are not the same thing.) I agree with but do
not take up the cry: "If the Justices expect the rest of us to take their
decisions seriously, they had better take them seriously them-
selves." 23 None of the sitting Justices feels bound by precedent in
the way the second Justice Harlan did.24 Today's Justices cast their
votes just as if prior cases did not exist, adding for good measure
(often with transparent, insincerity) that "even if the earlier case
were binding on me, I would still vote the same way because...."
That, however, is not my target; nor is the fillip that the same Jus-
tices often blubber about their colleagues' faithlessness to prece-
dent; Justices who take this line simply ensure that their successors
and comrades treat their opinions in the same way they treat others'.
I am concerned with the widely-shared belief that it should be espe-
cially easy to revisit a constitutional holding because these decisions
are immune from legislative upset. Statutory and common law cases
may be revised by Congress; constitutional doctrines may be revised
only by amendment and by the Court; since amendment is so hard,
it follows that revision by the Court should be easier. Everyone sup-
ports this position-with what enthusiasm in a given case depends
on whose ox is being gored, but every Justice subscribes to the basic
proposition. 25
22 A point the Court sometimes recognizes. See Rodriguez v. United States, 107 S.
Ct. 1391 (1987); see also Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988).
23 See Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979).
24 See Bourguignon, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: His Principles of Judicial Decision
Making, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 251.
25 Two cases decided on the same day-Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924
(1987), and Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987)-make the point.
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Yet the Constitution is a text and, like a statute, designed to
constrain the options of the present by a decision made in the past.
The objective in each case is to understand and apply that decision.
That the decision may imbue the living with discretion (whether
through an open-ended clause of the Constitution or through a
grant of power to regulate in the "public interest, convenience, or
necessity") is a detail; we are interested in either case with transmit-
ting the original decision free from garbles, and it is a garble to mis-
understand a rule or to treat a grant of discretion as if it were a rule.
The text (its history, structure, and so on) identifies the correct
treatment for either Constitution or statute.
The observation that it is hard to amend the Constitution does
not imply that judges should revise their work more freely. Con-
sider why the Constitutional Convention made amendment so hard.
One reason is to ensure that a super-majority of the people supports
any constitutional rule-whether a grant of power to the national
government, or a constraint on the exercise of power by govern-
ment-at the time of its inception. Another is to ensure stability in
the structure of government. The political branches and the people
can plan against the background of known rules; statutes presup-
pose certain constitutional doctrines (think of all the statutes, both
passed and foregone, that presuppose the existence of a "dormant
commerce clause"). They can plan not only transactions and stat-
utes but also campaigns of constitutional change.
Ready overruling of constitutional cases interferes with both
objectives. It reduces the stability of governmental institutions, de-
nying the polity the benefit (if such it is) of continuity. Not coinci-
dentally, it saps the drive for change in the constitutional text.
People who seek amendment know that the Court may change the
rules at any moment, making their campaign unnecessary or even
counterproductive (depending on the new rules the Court supplies).
Legislators may explain their inattention to proposed amendments
Solorio overruled O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Welch overruled Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). In each case the majority (Rehnquist, CJ., White,
Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ.) appealed to the principle that constitutional interpre-
tation should be flexible. Although Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissent-
ing in Solorio, chastised the majority for disregarding principles of stare decisis, 107 S.
Ct. at 2934, 2941 ("blatant disregard for principles of stare decisis"), the same three
(joined by Justice Stevens), dissenting in Welch, complained that the majority was elimi-
nating an aberrant case while taking the landscape as given; they proposed to overrule
more than 100 cases and completely recast the law of governmental immunities, 107 S.
Ct. at 2962-70. It did not trouble them that the same contention had been raised and
rejected quite recently. I do not join the battle about who was right on the merits in
Solorio and Welch. I raise the cases only to show that all nine Justices in these cases were
willing to revise constitutional rules, and the dispute seemed to be only about whether
to do so by the quart (the majority) or the tank car (the dissenters in Welch).
430 [Vol. 73:422
STABILITY AND RELIABILITY
with the refrain that the proposal may be unnecessary. (This was
one of the many excuses given for opposing the Equal Rights
Amendment. Whether the prophesy was self-fulfilling is an interest-
ing question that I do not pursue.) Proponents of the amendment
perceive the gains of change as less when the Court may come
'round, so they work less hard. The Court's emphasis on the diffi-
culty of amending the Constitution therefore may lead, paradoxi-
cally, to an increased difficulty in securing a change.
As for stability: it does not take much argument to demonstrate
that ready alteration of constitutional rules makes the effects of stat-
utes and private bargains less predictable. So although I do not
quarrel with the proposition that the Court ought to inter recent
mistakes before they do serious damage,26 I doubt that judges
should be any more ready to unravel long-standing constitutional
doctrines than they should be to revise long-standing statutory in-
terpretations. Indeed, things should work the other way. Precisely
because constitutional rules establish governmental structures, be-
cause they are the framework for all political interactions, it ought to
be harder to revise them than to change statutory rules. The reasons
for making amendment hard apply as well to overrulings.
Doctrines of the last twenty or even forty years do not have the
same structural effects as the dormant commerce clause (a product
of the mid-nineteenth century) or the application of the Bill of
Rights to the states (which had been going on slowly since 1897,
long before the acceleration in the 1960s).27 They still have wide-
spread effects on planning. Take Miranda v. Arizona,28 which the
Court unanimously reaffirmed a few years ago even though a major-
ity of the sitting Justices probably would not have thought the doc-
trine attractive as a matter of first principles. Miranda has become a
structural decision on which other doctrines and institutions de-
pend. For example, to the extent Miranda makes it harder to obtain
convictions, courts respond by increasing the sentences of those
who are convicted, so as to keep general deterrence constant. The
higher sentence levels are built into the guidelines that control sen-
tencing in federal courts, and into the penalty structures of state
26 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (overruling United States v.
Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975)); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313
(1973)). The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870), are the most famous
flip-flop of this kind. It is easy to call such reversals "self-inflicted wounds," but the
costs of, say, leaving the first Legal Tender case, Hepborn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
603 (1869), standing would have been much higher.
27 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (takings
clause); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (laying groundwork for some
incorporation, although Court did not follow Hurtado's path).
28 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
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law. One could not change Miranda without being prepared to re-
think criminal sentences. So too with civil liability. We can contem-
plate "good faith immunity" for the police with more equanimity,
given Miranda and the pressure it places on police to behave, than
we could if only the pre-Miranda voluntariness doctrines governed
interrogations.
A slightly different way to put this is to say that a constitutional
overruling depends on moral and prudential judgments more than
strictly legal ones. On the legal side, we can tell that a given rule has
been eroded, but the erosion usually marks a moral or prudential
problem-moral in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,29 prudential in the
case of Betts v. Brady,30 two cases properly dispatched even under my
approach. The willingness of later generations of judges to evade
or cabin the cases suggests that they were wrong, and even if not
wrong were causing more trouble than they were worth. Other doc-
trines have received different treatment. "Substantive due pro-
cess"-a doctrine without a constitutional foundation,31 but one
practiced by judges ever since Justice Chase invoked "natural law"
in Calder v. Bull 2-has been expanded rather than contracted
through time. We see little effort to evade or challenge it in the
legislature, no moral revulsion, no indication that the body of the
law has rejected a transplanted foreign organ. LaterJustices should
respect such a doctrine as part of our governmental structure
whether or not they think it wrong as a matter of first principles.
To accept the structural features of a doctrine is not necessarily
to accept any given application. The application of this doctrine to
produce a case such as Roe v. Wade33 is not immune from scrutiny.
The structural aspects of any constitutional doctrine should be more
enduring than any one application. (I am not interested for current
purposes in applications and express no views on any legal rule.)
There is, moreover, a genuinely difficult problem in understanding
the level of generality at which a constitutional doctrine should be
preserved. Take the application of the equal protection clause to
subjects other than race. That was accomplished long ago and is the
basis of much of our existing governmental structure. But the con-
clusion that laws must be equal with respect to things other than
race does not assist us in knowing what "equality" is; it is an empty
vessel that can receive many libations. Judges should be shy about
taking any rule at a high level of generality. Exceedingly general
29 163 U.S. 537 (1895).
30 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
31 See Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 85.
32 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-89 (1798).
33 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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rules, coupled with the understanding that judges have the power to
interpret the law, transfer effective legislative power to the courts.
34
None of these limitations, however, affects the point I have been
making, so long as it is clear that the proposition "doctrine X should
be left in place unless there is a consensus that it is wicked" is not
equivalent to "doctrine X should be pressed for all it can be worth."
Just as the Court wisely has declined to discard Miranda, so it has
wisely declined to extend it.
I have brought you a few contentions: that the role of precedent
should be similar for all decisions interpreting texts, with any differ-
ence in the direction of making it harder to revise constitutional in-
terpretation, and that precedent can be a destabilizing as well as a
stabilizing influence. Beyond those affronts to accepted wisdom I
have little to say. I began without a theory of stare decisis and end
that way.
34 See American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 137-40 (7th Cir. 1987)
(dissenting opinion).
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